Field Notes / Supply Chain
Five OVHcloud CLI releases turned into stealers for 94 minutes. A pinned hash caught it.
On 19 October 2026 an attacker used a hijacked developer account to swap the binaries of OVHcloud CLI v0.11.0 to v0.15.0 for a build that copied cloud keys, SSH keys and AI assistant data off every machine that ran it. About 250 downloads landed in the window. Homebrew users were safe and one customer’s CI noticed in an hour. Here is why the release page’s own checksums proved nothing, and the five checks that close the same gap in your toolchain.
01 What happened on 19 October
customer’s build broke. Their CI pinned the SHA-256 of
ovhcloud-cli_Linux_arm64.tar.gz from v0.15.0, a release
published on 16 September. On the afternoon of 19 October the hash
changed. They pulled the new binary apart, found a local
go build of a later commit with uncommitted changes, and
opened issue #300 on the repository asking whether it was intentional
Issue #300 . It was not.
| 19 Oct, Paris time | What |
|---|---|
| 14:47 | v0.15.0 macOS binary replaced |
| 14:57 | All v0.15.0 binaries replaced, plus its checksums.txt |
| 15:30 | Binaries of v0.11.0 to v0.14.0 replaced |
| 15:50 | Customer reports the swap in a public GitHub issue |
| 16:21 | OVHcloud deletes every malicious binary |
| 18:52 | Public announcement on X |
| 19:16 | Clean v0.16.0 released with a signed tag, as an immutable release |
The timeline comes from OVHcloud’s own advisory, published the next day OVHcloud 2026 . From report to clean-up took 31 minutes. That is a fast response. It still left an hour and a half in which anyone running the install script got the stealer.
The root cause goes back a year. OVHcloud traced it to an extension, color-picker-universal 2.8.91, which the
developer installed on a personal MacBook on 20 October 2025. The
extension called a Solana wallet that researchers had already tied to the
GlassWorm campaign. Several of the developer’s personal repositories were
tampered with in March 2026. The release swap itself was done with the
stolen keys, from elsewhere. OVHcloud says the developer’s work laptop
was not compromised as far as it knows
OVHcloud 2026 .
02 Who was safe, and why
The install path decided everything. Same software, same day, five different outcomes.
| Install path | Exposed? | Why |
|---|---|---|
brew install --cask ovh/tap/ovhcloud-cli | No | The cask records each archive’s SHA-256 at release time. A swapped file fails the check |
install.sh piped to sh | Yes | The script downloads the latest archive and checks no hash |
| Manual download from GitHub releases | Yes | The attacker also rewrote checksums.txt, so the page vouched for its own malware |
go install or source build | No | The git tags were never moved. v0.15.0 still pointed at the real commit |
Docker image ovhcom/ovhcloud-cli | No | Reported unaffected by the researchers at OpenSourceMalware |
GitHub has a setting built for this. An immutable release locks its tag
and assets once published, and GitHub signs an attestation of what was
in it GitHub Docs . You can then
check a release with gh release verify. The OVHcloud CLI
repository did not have it switched on, which OVHcloud names as the main
issue. It is now on across the organisation. Releases published before
that change stay editable unless they are republished.
03 What the stealer took
OVHcloud’s first public description said the binary was built to grab secrets from disk. The advisory has the full list. The malware went well past OVH credentials:
- Cloud accounts. AWS (including S3), Google Cloud and Azure credentials and configuration, plus DigitalOcean’s
doctlconfig. - Infrastructure access. Kubernetes and Docker configuration, Terraform credentials, SSH keys,
.netrc, npm configuration and the global git config. - AI assistants. Local databases of VS Code, Cursor, Continue, Sourcegraph Cody and OpenCode, sessions of the Hermes agent, and the Claude agent’s configuration and data directory.
That last group is the trend to watch. AI coding assistants keep provider keys, chat history and pasted code on the developer’s disk. We saw stolen AI keys turn into real bills after the OpenCode Console breach three days earlier. The GhostAction workflows in GitHub are hunting for the same keys in commits (our note on GhostAction).
The stealer copied everything into a temp folder named
envchecker- plus nine or ten digits, archived it, and sent
it to a server it looked up through Solana RPC calls. It never deletes
that folder. If the folder exists on a machine, the binary ran there
OVHcloud 2026 .
04 A sovereign cloud still ships through GitHub
Many European companies pick OVHcloud because it is French and holds their data under European law. That choice covers the data centre. The laptop where your engineer keeps the API keys sits outside it, and so does the tool that put them there.
OVHcloud is candid about the split. Its production CI/CD runs on private, internal git servers, audited and untouched by this incident. GitHub is where it publishes tools for customers, and there the controls were looser: a managed organisation with mandatory 2FA, but developers attach their personal GitHub accounts to it, "as do most of tech companies" OVHcloud 2026 . Two-factor authentication did not help, because the attacker used keys stolen from the developer’s own Mac.
Swap OVHcloud for any provider and the picture holds. Your cloud contract covers the region. Your actual exposure runs through every CLI, Terraform provider and SDK your team pulls from a public release page, each one published by a person with a personal account and a personal laptop. This CLI ran on machines that also held AWS, Azure and Google keys, and it took all of them.
05 Five checks for this week
Do the first one today if anyone in your company uses the OVHcloud CLI. The rest apply to any tool you install from a release page.
- Find every machine and CI runner that installed or updated the OVHcloud CLI on 19 October. Without running it, compare the binary’s MD5 against the five hashes in advisory GHSA-862f-55f5-vmvw and look for an envchecker folder in the temp directory. Where either matches, rotate OVH API keys first, then every cloud, SSH, registry and AI provider credential on that machine, and confirm the old ones fail
- Upgrade to v0.16.0 and check it with gh release verify v0.16.0 -R ovh/ovhcloud-cli before you trust it
- Pin a SHA-256 for every binary your pipelines download, recorded at the time you first approved it and stored in your own repository. Never compare against a checksums file served from the same release page
- Replace curl-pipe-to-shell installs on developer machines with a package manager that pins hashes, or with go install or a source build at a fixed tag
- If you publish tools on GitHub yourself, turn on immutable releases for the organisation, republish your current releases, and require signed tags. Then check who can upload release assets and whether those accounts are personal
One customer with one pinned hash caught this in about an hour. Most teams have no such tripwire. Their build would have installed the new binary without complaint. A penetration test of your build pipeline shows how many of yours would. In 14 days you get every tool that reaches your engineers’ machines and pipelines, which ones verify what they install, which secrets sit beside them, and the change that closes each gap. Start with your Threat Map, from $5,000.
Questions readers ask
What happened to the OVHcloud CLI?
On 19 October 2026 an attacker used a compromised OVHcloud developer’s GitHub account to replace the release binaries of OVHcloud CLI versions v0.11.0 to v0.15.0 with malicious builds. The swapped files were live from 14:47 to 16:21 Paris time (12:47 to 14:21 UTC), 94 minutes in total. OVHcloud counted about 250 downloads in that window. The source code and OVHcloud’s internal build chain were not affected, and OVHcloud released a clean, immutable v0.16.0 the same evening.
Am I affected by the OVHcloud CLI compromise?
Only if you downloaded or updated the CLI from GitHub releases or the install script between 14:47 and 16:21 Paris time on 19 October 2026 and then ran it. Copies of v0.11.0 to v0.15.0 downloaded before that are clean. Homebrew installs, go install, source builds and the Docker image were not affected. To check safely without running the binary, compare its MD5 hash with the five hashes in OVHcloud’s advisory GHSA-862f-55f5-vmvw, and look in your temp folder for a directory named envchecker followed by digits.
What did the malicious OVHcloud CLI steal?
OVHcloud’s advisory lists AWS, Google Cloud and Azure credentials, Kubernetes, Docker, npm, Terraform and DigitalOcean configuration, SSH keys, .netrc, the global git config, and local data from VS Code, Cursor, Continue, Sourcegraph Cody, OpenCode, the Hermes agent and the Claude agent. The binary copied these into a temp folder, archived it and sent it to a server whose address it looked up through Solana RPC calls. If you ran it, treat every secret on that machine as compromised.
Why were Homebrew users safe from the OVHcloud CLI attack?
The Homebrew cask for the OVHcloud CLI records the SHA-256 hash of each release archive when the release is published. The attacker replaced the archives weeks later, so a Homebrew install during the window would have downloaded a file whose hash no longer matched and refused to install it. The official install script does not check a hash, and the attacker also rewrote the checksums.txt file on the release page, so checking against that file proved nothing.
References
Sources
- OVHcloud. ovhcloud-cli security incident, 19 October 2026. GitHub security advisory GHSA-862f-55f5-vmvw, published 20 October 2026. github.com
- alink-tothepast. Release assets of v0.13.0–v0.15.0 replaced on 2026-10-19 with a dirty build of a later commit. ovh/ovhcloud-cli issue #300, 19 October 2026. github.com
- The Hacker News. Hackers Hijack Five OVHcloud CLI Releases to Distribute Secret-Stealing Malware. October 2026. thehackernews.com
- IT-Connect. OVHcloud CLI binaries on GitHub were tampered with by an infostealer. October 2026. it-connect.tech
- GitHub Docs. Immutable releases. docs.github.com